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Abstract
This Article provides an overview of the process leading up to the first comprehensive German-
Jewish reparations agreements in order to give a historical context to the contemporary discussion
of Holocaust-related reparations and restitution. The Article further attempts to shed some light
on the behind-the-scenes role played by Josef Rosensaft, one of the individuals involved in the
early stages of the reparations negotiations, and his parallel efforts to remedy the 1950-1951 de-
nial of compensation payments to some 18,000 Jewish DP’s by the German Land (State) of Lower
Saxony.
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INTRODUCTION
The tremendous catastrophe that befell European Jewry
during the Holocaust is universally recognized as immeasurable
in scope. Millions were murdered, thousands of Jewish commu-
nities were decimated, and at the end of the Second World War,
several hundred thousand surviving Jews had become homeless
refugees, or Displaced Persons ("DPs"). In addition to the enor-
mous human suffering, the material losses suffered by the vic-
tims of the Holocaust, both individually and collectively, were
incalculable. Many of the murdered Jews were heirless, and the
anticipated cost of enabling the survivors to rebuild their lives in
Palestine and elsewhere was enormous. Early on, while the im-
plementation of Hitler's "Final Solution of the Jewish Question"
was still underway, a number of legal scholars had begun to de-
velop the juridical and philosophical bases for some type of post-
war material compensation by Germany for its persecution of
and crimes against the Jewish people.'
During the years following the end of the Holocaust, how-
ever, the concept of Jews accepting either communally or per-
sonally what many survivors and Jewish intellectuals considered
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1. See, e.g., NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, INDEMNIFICATION AND REPARATIONS: JEWISH As-
PECTS (1944); SIEGFRIED MOSES, DIEJODISCHEN NACHKRIEGS-FORDERUNGEN ["TheJewish
Post-war Claims"] (1944); SIEGFRIED GOLDSCHMIDT, LEGAL CLAIMS AGAINST GERMANY:
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES RESULTING FROM ANTI-RAcIAL MEASURES (1945).
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to be tantamount to "blood money" was highly controversial. 2
Moreover, even among those Jewish leaders who advocated ac-
cepting material compensation from Germany, there were at
least two distinct, although by no means mutually exclusive, con-
cepts of the form that such compensation should take. One rep-
arations model envisioned some type of collective monetary
compensation to the Jewish people to support the resettlement
and absorption of the survivors. At the same time, others argued
that individual survivors were entitled to compensation for their
suffering, and that a mechanism for them to assert their claims
had to be devised. In 1945, no model or precedent existed for
either type of reparations. The National Socialist Hitler ("Nazi")
regime had persecuted, oppressed, robbed, and murdered Jews
from all the European territories under its control. However,
the victimized Jews were not recognized as a separate and dis-
tinct entity under international law, no Jewish political body had
the requisite legal standing to represent either the survivors or
the heirs of the murdered, and there did not exist a forum
where individual survivors could bring their claims for compen-
sation or restitution.
In 1948, the U.S. military Government in Germany empow-
ered an American based Jewish successor agency to claim and
receive heirless Jewish property in the American Zone of Ger-
many for the benefit of Jewish Holocaust survivors,3 and several
of the Ldnder (States) in the Western zones of occupation en-
acted limited compensation laws. 4 Eventually, a far-reaching
German-Jewish reparations program was created pursuant to the
1952 Luxembourg Agreements, which included a State Treaty
("Treaty") between the Federal Republic of Germany ("FRG")
and the State of Israel, and two accords entered into as Protocols
between the FRG and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Against Germany ("Claims Conference").5 The Treaty provided
2. See, e.g., SHLOMO SHAFIR, AMBIGUOUS RELATIONS: THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMU-
NITY AND GERMANY SINCE 1945, at 170 (1999); NICHOLAS BALABKINS, WEST GERMAN REPA-
RATIONS To ISRAEL 87 (1971); HOWARD M. SACHAR, ISRAEL AND EUROPE: AN APPRAISAL IN
HISTORY 37 (1998).
3. See NANA SAGI, GERMAN REPARATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 41
(1980).
4. See SHAFIR, supra note 2, at 61-62; INGE DEUTSCHKRON, BONN AND JERUSALEM:
THE STRANGE COALITION 43-44 (1970).
5. For the text of the Luxembourg Agreements, see The Agreement Between the
Federal Republic of Germany and The State of Israel, in KURT R. GROSSMANN, GER-
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for payment by the FRG to Israel of DM 3 billion in annual in-
stallments over a twelve-year period in the form of goods and
services in consideration of Israel's absorption of Holocaust sur-
vivors and refugees from Nazi Germany.6 Pursuant to Protocol
No. 1, the FRG obligated itself to enact legislation for the direct
payment of restitution and indemnification to individual Jewish
victims of Nazi persecution.7 Protocol No. 2 further obligated
the FRG to pay to Israel, for the benefit of the Claims Confer-
ence, the sum of DM 450 million over a twelve-year period,' to
"be used for the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish
victims of National Socialist persecution, according to the ur-
gency of their needs as determined by [the Claims Confer-
ence] ."9
From the vantage point of the year 2002, the fact that Ger-
many has paid more than DM 100 billion in what is euphemisti-
cally called reparations (or, in German, Wiedergutmachung, liter-
ally "to make good again") to more than 500,000 Jewish Holo-
caust survivors since 195310 is generally taken for granted.
Indeed, the principle that Germany had a moral and quasi-legal
obligation to pay monetary compensation to Jews who had suf-
fered in ghettos and Nazi concentration camps during the Sec-
ond World War is a functional cornerstone of the more recent
settlements of Holocaust-related claims against Swiss and Aus-
trian banks for, respectively, U.S.$1.25 billion and U.S.$40 mil-
lion.1" This notion of Germany's compensatory responsibility
MANY'S MORAL DEBT: THE GERMAN-ISRAEL AGREEMENT 37-56 (1954) [hereinafter GROSS-
MANN]. The Treaty was signed by Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of the FRG, in
Luxembourg, and Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel, on September 10, 1952,
and was ratified by the Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany ("FRG") on
March 18, 1953. Protocols Nos. I and 2 were signed by Chancellor Adenauer and Dr.
Nahum Goldmann, Chairman of the Claims Conference. Id. at 26.
6. See id. at 37, art. I(a). On March 18, 1953, when the Treaty was ratified by the
Bundestag, the lower house of the FRG Parliament, DM 3 billion was the equivalent of
U.S.$715 million. Id. at 1, 8.
7. See id. at 49, Protocol No. 1.
8. See id. at 54, Protocol No. 2.
9. Id. at 56, Protocol No. 2, art. 2. The State of Israel assumed the obligation to
pay this amount to the Claims Conference in annual installments, upon receipt from
the FRG, under Article 3(c) of the Treaty. Id. at 38.
10. THE CONFERENCE ON JEWISH MATERIAL CLAIMS AGAINST GERMANY, HISTORY OF
THE CLAIMS CONFERENCE: A CHRONOLOGY 17 (2001) [hereinafter CLAIMS CONFERENCE
CHRONOLOGY].
11. Id. at 27-28; see generally THE PLUNDER OFJEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE HOLO-
CAUST: CONFRONTING EUROPEAN HISTORY (Avi Beker ed., 2001).
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was also fundamental to the December 1999 agreement estab-
lishing a DM 10 billion fund to compensate those who, in the
words of German President Johannes Rau, "were subjected to
slave and forced labor under German rule .... 2
It is important to bear in mind, however, that only fifty years
ago, the very concept of any such broad-based German repara-
tions to the Jewish people was remarkable. The Luxembourg
Agreements
set a precedent in international law. The German Govern-
ment had negotiated not only with representatives of Israel,
which had no diplomatic relations with Germany, but recog-
nized the representatives of world Jewry, thereby recognizing
that the Jewish people as a whole had suffered grave injury
resulting from Nazi persecution and were legally entitled to
compensation. 13
This Article provides an overview of the process leading up
to the first comprehensive German-Jewish reparations agree-
ments in order to give a historical context to the contemporary
discussion of Holocaust-related reparations and restitution. The
Article further attempts to shed some light on the behind-the-
scenes role played by Josef Rosensaft, 14 one of the individuals
involved in the early stages of the reparations negotiations, and
his parallel efforts to remedy the 1950-1951 denial of compensa-
tion payments to some 18,000 Jewish DPs by the German Land
(State) of Lower Saxony.
There exist several detailed accounts of the inception of
German-Jewish reparations. 15 However, while the identities and
accomplishments of the principal protagonists of the early repa-
rations saga, such as Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the
World Jewish Congress ("WJC") and of the Claims Conference,
and Dr. Noah Barou, one of the leaders of the WJC's British sec-
tion and Chairman of the European Executive of the WJC, are
12. CLAIMS CONFERENCE CHRONOLOGY, supra note 10, at 27.
13. GROSSMANN, supra note 5, at 26.
14. Josef Rosensaft, 1911-1975, popularly known as "Yossel" or "Yossele," is, respec-
tively, the father and grandfather of the authors of this article. Regarding Rosensaft
generally, see Menachem Z. Rosensaft, My Father: A Model for Empowerment, in LIFE RE-
BORN: JEWISH DISPLACED PERSONS 1945-1951, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 77-79
(Menachem Z. Rosensaft ed., 2001) [hereinafter LIFE REBORN]; S.J. GOLDSMITH, TwENYrv
20TH CENTURYJEws 86-92 (1962).
15. See, e.g., BALABKINS, supra note 2; DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4; SAGI, supra note
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acknowledged, Rosensaft's involvement is not widely known.
There are only a few, mostly cryptic references to him in the
published accounts. Gottlieb Hammer, Executive Director of
the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine ("Jewish
Agency") in the early 1950s, wrote in his memoirs:
Rosensaft was one of the first, together with Noah Baru [sic],
who felt that Germany should not be permitted to keep the
untold treasures stolen by the Nazis from Jewish communities
throughout Europe, that Germany should be made to pay in
some measure for the expense of rehabilitating surviving Jews
and restoring to them a measure of their assets. It was these
two men who prevailed upon Nahum Goldmann to under-
take the leadership which resulted in the successful culmina-
tion of the effort to recover restitution and reparations from
the postwar Federal German Republic.16
Other references to Rosensaft in a reparations context are
even less informative. Gerhart M. Riegner, the long-time Secre-
tary General of the WJC, confirms Hammer's recollections by re-
ferring to Rosensaft's participation in a day-long summer 1951
meeting in Zurich with Goldmann and Barou during which the
possibility of obtaining reparations from Germany, and Barou's
initial efforts in that connection, were discussed in detail for the
first time with Goldmann.17 In that context, Riegner noted that
Rosensaft "had been charged by Goldmann with certain activi-
ties in Germany." 18 Goldmann himself, in the fourth incarna-
tion of his autobiography, wrote that "[d] uring the negotiations
with the Federal Republic [of Germany], Jossele was very helpful
to me. He knew Ludwig Erhard, Blankenhorn, Hallstein and
many others-who were all extremely impressed by him-and
often brought them messages from me." 9 Goldmann's refer-
16. GOTTLIEB HAMMER, GOOD FAITH AND CREDIT 215 (1985). Hammer further
wrote that "[t]he idea of obtaining economic reparations for the State of Israel and
monetary restitution to individual Jews who had suffered at the hands of the Nazis" was
.conceived and nurtured principally" by Barou and Rosensaft who "interested Gold-
mann in their proposal and urged him to take the leadership in asserting Jewish claims
against the German Federal Republic .... " Id. at 240.
17. GERHART M. RIEGNER, NE JAMAIs DPSESP9IRER: SOIXANTE ANNtES AU SERVICE DU
PEUPLE JUIF ET DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ["Never Despair: Sixty Years in the Service of
the Jewish People and of Human Rights"] 567 (1998).
18. Id. (author's trans.).
19. NAHUM GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHER JUDE ["My Life as a German
Jew"] 339 (1980) (author's trans.). Earlier versions of Goldmann's memoirs were THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NAHUM GOLDMANN: SIXTY YEARS OF JEWISH LIFE 250 (1969);
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ences are to FRG Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard; Herbert
Blankenhorn, Political Director at the FRG Foreign Office; and
Walter Hallstein, Staatssekretdr (Secretary of State) at the FRG
Foreign Office. Finally, a footnote in a study of Israel's foreign
policy system notes with respect to the reparations negotiations
that "[olther persons who were active in those early contacts"
included "Yossele Rosenzaft [sic], a leader of the survivors of the
Bergen-Belsen extermination camp. "20
An understanding of Rosensaft's role and activities in the
negotiations preceding the Luxembourg Agreements may pro-
vide a new perspective on the circumstances that resulted in
monetary compensation being paid to hundreds of thousands of
Holocaust survivors. Unlike Goldmann, Barou, and otherJewish
leaders who had spent the war years in New York, London, or
Tel Aviv, Rosensaft was a survivor of Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen,
and other Nazi concentration camps. Prior to his involvement
in the strategizing and negotiations leading up to the Luxem-
bourg Agreements, Rosensaft had already been actively engaged
in efforts to obtain monetary compensation for Jewish DPs on
the local level in Lower Saxony where the DP camp of Bergen-
Belsen was located. The authors of this Article have had access
to previously unexamined letters and telegrams between and
among Rosensaft, Barou, Goldmann, and others from Rosen-
saft's private archive ("Rosensaft Archive"), as well as the unpub-
lished manuscript of the memoirs of Rosensaft's wife, the late
Hadassah Rosensaft. As a result, it has been possible to inte-
grate, albeit to a limited extent only, Rosensaft's role and activi-
ties into this overview of the early phase of the German-Jewish
reparations process leading up to the Luxembourg Agreements.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of the Concept of German Reparations to the
Jewish People
As early as 1941, Goldmann, then chairman of the WJC's
Executive Board, told the Pan American Conference of Jewish
leaders, convened in Baltimore by the wJC: "Who can doubt
that we Jews have every right to international help for European
STAATSMANN OHNE STAAT ["Statesman Without a State"] (1970); and THE JEWISH PARA-
DOX (1978).
20. MICHAEL BRECHER, DECISIONS IN ISRAEL'S FOREIGN POLICY 75 n.1 (1974).
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Jewry after the war? If reparations are to be paid, we are the first
to have a claim on them. 2 1 In Palestine, meanwhile, two leading
Zionists of German origin, Dr. George Landauer and Dr. Sieg-
fried Moses, developed the concept that the Jewish people, al-
though a nation without a State, had a legitimate claim against
Germany, and that such a collective claim should be recognized
following Germany's defeat.
22
In October 1944, at the international War Emergency Con-
ference of the WJC held in Atlantic City, a formal resolution was
adopted incorporating both demands for restitution and com-
pensation to individual Jewish victims of Nazi persecution, and
recognition of the principle of collective compensation to the
Jewish people for material and moral losses suffered by the Jew-
ish people and its institutions, or by individual Jews (or their
heirs) who were unable to assert their own claims. 23 That same
year, the WJC's Institute ofJewish Affairs in New York published
a monograph by Dr. Nehemiah Robinson in which he argued
that postwar Germany would have to pay individual compensa-
tion, restore property, and pay collective compensation to the
Jewish people as a whole. 24 Robinson accurately foresaw and an-
alyzed many of the complex legal issues arising out of the Third
Reich's persecution and mass murder of European Jewry, includ-
ing the need to provide for compensation in situations where
restitution was not a feasible remedy,25 the consequences of the
fact that "certain Jewish communities may have disappeared alto-
gether, and the practical difficulties that individual Jewish vic-
tims of Nazi persecution, or their heirs, would be forced to con-
front in asserting claims for restitution or compensation. 27 Most
significantly, Robinson formulated two of the fundamental and
interrelated principles that would be at the heart of the post-
Holocaust Jewish restitution and reparations process, namely
that heirless Jewish property must not be allowed to escheat to
21. See GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN AL-s DEUTSCHER JUDE, supra note 19, at 372;
BRECHER, supra note 20, at 72.
22. See SAGI, supra note 3, at 17-21, 26; MOSES, supra note 1; DEUTSCHKRON, supra
note 4, at 42.
23. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHERJUDE, supra note 19, at 372-73.
24. ROBINSON, INDEMNIFICATION AND REPARATIONS, supra note 1.
25. Id. at 145.
26. Id. at 245.
27. Id. at 260-61.
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the State, and that such property must be used for the benefit of
the survivors of Nazi persecution:
Since . . . many Jewish families and even entire Jewish com-
munities may have disappeared, there would be no legal heir,
in the orthodox sense, for their properties and claims, as well
as for those of various Jewish organizations. Usually the State,
as universal heir for defunct physical persons without legally
recognized heirs and for extinguished legal persons, inherits
all their property and rights to indemnification. The applica-
tion of this rule would, indeed, be a great injustice to the Jew-
ish people. The great sufferings caused the Jewish people by
the war and its aftermath, entitle us to expect thai some kind
of political and economic security will be obtained for the
survivors. Since many Jews have emigrated to other coun-
tries, where they have not yet been able to find adequate work
and vocations, and others will follow, large funds will be nec-
essary for their colonization and settlement in those or other
countries or regions. Certain already established Jewish com-
munities may also require considerable funds. For the pur-
pose of any such project the property and rights of the de-
funct Jewish families and extinguished organizations and
communities would be most appropriate.2 8
B. Conditions in Germany Immediately After the Second World War
The history of the reparations process must be seen in the
context of the conditions that existed in Germany after the Hol-
ocaust. In the spring and summer of 1945, the victorious Allied
forces were confronted with more than ten million uprooted
and homeless non-Germans who found themselves in Germany
at the end of the war. The vast majority of them, including Jews
from Western European countries, were successfully repatriated
in a matter of months. Tens of thousands of Jews from Eastern
Europe, however, especially those from Poland, were unwilling
to return to their pre-war homes. Having been subjected to
widespread anti-Semitism both before and during the Holocaust
on the part of their Christian neighbors, these Jewish survivors
wanted only to begin new lives in countries that were not
haunted by bitter memories. Classified as "Displaced Persons,"
they were placed in camps under the control of the respective
American, British, and French military authorities. During 1945
28. Id. at 256-57.
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and 1946, large numbers of otherJews from various parts of East-
ern Europe also came to Germany, substantially increasing the
population of the DP camps. In short order, many of these
camps became thriving, mostly autonomous Jewish communities
with their own political leadership, newspapers, and a host of
educational, religious, and cultural institutions.29
The largest of these DP camps, with a population that at
times exceeded 10,000, was Bergen-Belsen (often referred to
simply as "Belsen") in Lower Saxony in the British Zone of Ger-
many, located in erstwhile German military barracks near the
site of the former Nazi concentration camp of the same name. °
Professor Norman Bentwich, Vice-Chairman of the Jewish Com-
mittee for Relief Abroad, the parent body of the British Jewish
Relief Units, wrote that the Jewish survivors
had a strong sense of self-assertion and a resolve to run their
own affairs and make their voices heard. In every bigger
[DPI camp there was an elected leader and committee, or
Town Council; and in Belsen itself a central Jewish committee
of liberated Jews, which represented the surviving Jewish pop-
ulation both in the towns and in the camps of the British
Zone. Leaders were thrown up who had an intense energy
and imperious will for self-determination. The leader in Bel-
sen, Josef (Yossel) Rosenzaft [sic], soon became a legendary
figure.
For more than five years, Rosensaft, a Polish Jew who had sur-
vived months of torture and solitary confinement at Auschwitz,
headed the Central Jewish Committee in the British Zone of
Germany ("Central Committee"), which encompassed the Jewish
DPs as well as the newly reconstituted German-Jewish communi-
ties of cities such as Hamburg, Cologne, Bremen, Dfisseldorf,
29. See generally, LIFE REBORN, supra note 14; MICHAEL BRENNER, AFTER THE HOLO-
CAUST: REBUILDING JEWISH LIFE IN POSTWAR GERMANY 30-32 (1995); ANGELIKA KCINIG-
SREDER & JULIANE WETZEL, WAITING FOR HOPE: JEWISH DISPLACED PERSONS IN POST-
WORLD WAR II GERMANY (2001).
30. Hagit Lavsky, A Community of Survivors: Bergen-Belsen as a Jewish Centre after 1945,
in BELSEN IN HISTORY AND MEMORY 162, 162-64 (Jo Reilly et al. eds., 1997); JOANNE
REILLY, BELSEN: THE LIBERATION OF A CONCENTRATION CAMP 78, 82, 91 (1998). See gener-
ally, BELSEN (1957), published by the Irgun Sheerit Hapleita Me'Haezor Habriti ["The
Organization of the Surviving Remnant of the British Zone"] [hereinafter BELSEN].
31. NORMAN BENTWICH, THEY FOUND REFUGE: AN ACCOUNT OF BRITISH JEWRY'S
WORK FOR VICTIMS OF NAZI OPPRESSION 143 (1956). See also GOLDSMITH, supra note 14,
at 88-89 (Rosensaft "created, out of misery and chaos, the firstJewish autonomous com-
munity in modern times, a kind of miniature republic").
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and Hanover.12 The Central Committee administered the affairs
of the Belsen DP camp until March 1947, when a separate Belsen
committee, also headed by Rosensaft, was elected. 3
Writing in 1953, a former senior official of the American
Jewish Joint Distribution Committee ('JDC") in the American
Zone of Germany wrote that during April and May, 1945, Rosen-
saft had become recognized as the undisputed leader of the Jew-
ish DPs of Belsen,
leaving nothing undone to assist his people. When the Brit-
ish Military were selecting a limited number of the sick for
convalescence in Sweden, he interceded for members of fam-
ilies who were again being separated. With an unfailing nose
for German and Hungarian collaborationists, he hunted
down dozens who had concealed themselves among the liber-
ated. He spurred British soldiers to collect clothing for the
thousands being discharged from the temporary hospital, in
the former Panzer Training School. He possessed an un-
canny ability to locate danger spots and to hammer at the
highest authorities for action.3 4
According to one historian of post-Holocaust Jewish life in Ger-
many, Rosensaft "ruled the Jews in the British Occupation Zone
with almost dictatorial powers but was repeatedly reelected dem-
ocratically and did everything to improve the conditions of 'his'
Jews."35
From the outset, he successfully defended the Jewish DPs'
interests in a series of confrontations with the British military
authorities. In May 1945, he frustrated an attempt to resettle
several thousand Jewish DPs from Belsen in another DP camp in
Northern Germany where conditions proved to be significantly
inferior, an action for which he was put on trial before a military
tribunal and ultimately acquitted.36 Refused permission to hold
32. See generally, HAGIT LAVSKY, NEW BEGINNINGS: HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS IN BER-
GEN-BELSEN AND THE BRITISH ZONE IN GERMANY 1945-1950 (2002); Juliane Wetzel, Die
Selbstverwaltung der Sche'erit Haplejta: Das Zentralkomitee der befreiten Juden in der britischen
Zone 1945-1951 ["The Self-Administration of the Surviving Remnant: The Central Com-
mittee of the LiberatedJews in the British Zone 1945-1951"], in IM SCHATrEN DES HOLO-
CAUST ["In the Shadow of the Holocaust"] 43-54 (Herbert Obenaus ed., 1977) [herein-
after IM SCHATTEN DES HOLOCAUST].
33. REILLY, supra note 30, at 173-74.
34. LEO ScHwARz, THE REDEEMERS: A SAGA OF THE YEARS 1945-1952, at 32-33
(1953).
35. BRENNER, supra note 29, at 32.
36. REILLY, supra note 30, at 83-84 (1998); GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 89; BREN-
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a congress of Jewish DPs in Belsen in the summer of 1945, he
convened one anyway, and invited prominent Jewish political
leaders from Great Britain to participate. 7 In 1946, when the
British sought to prevent thousands of Polish Jews from entering
the British Zone, Rosensaft and his Committee openly defied the
Military Government by giving them sanctuary in Belsen and
cared for them illegally. 8 He repeatedly and publicly criticized
the British Government's anti-Zionist policies. According to offi-
cial British Foreign Office documents, the British authorities
considered him to be an "extreme Zionist" and a "dangerous
troublemaker."39 A senior British official complained that "[t] he
difficulties our authorities have had in dealing with Jewish DPs
in the British Zone are in large measure directly attributable to
him."4 °
In 1946, he married a fellow survivor, Dr. Hadassah Bimko.
Rosensaft remained in the Belsen DP camp for more than five
years until all but a few hundred of its inhabitants had resettled
outside of Germany. When the Belsen DP camp was closed in
the summer of 1950 and these remaining survivors were moved
to another DP camp, Upjever, in northern Germany, Rosensaft
accompanied them, and spent the following year shuttling be-
tween Upjever and Montreux, Switzerland, where he had found
a temporary home for his family.
II. GERMAN RESTITUTION AND COMPENSATION TO JEWISH
VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION PRIOR TO THE
LUXEMBOURG AGREEMENTS
After the end of the Second World War, the subject of ob-
taining restitution of property first became a practical concern
for those German Jews living in their former communities who
wanted to retrieve their homes, businesses, and other assets. Ini-
tially, this issue was not a priority for most of the Jewish DPs from
Eastern Europe who did not have such expectations. Norbert
Wollheim, an Auschwitz survivor originally from Berlin and Vice-
NER, supra note 29, at 32;Josef Rosensaft, Our Belsen, in BELSEN, supra note 30, at 24, 27-
29.
37. KONIGSREDER & WETZEL, supra note 29,.at 83-84;Josef Rosensaft, supra note 36,
at 37.
38. REILLY, supra note 30, at 103.
39. Id. at 100, 105.
40. Id. at 105.
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Chairman of the Central Committee, recalled that when leaders
of the German Jewish communities first brought the problem of
indemnification and restitution to the DP leaders in Bergen-Bel-
sen and to Jewish organizations outside Germany, the "reaction
among the Chaveirim [colleagues or friends] at Belsen" was one
of skepticism:
"How is any indemnification or compensation possible for
what has been done to us and ours?" was their understanda-
bly emotional reply. But during the years following those first
debates, and after the first tangible legislation concerning the
restitution demands had come out, the essential validity of
these demands of the [German-] Jewish communities was fi-
nally understood also by the Chaveirim. This meant simply,
that the idea had been generally accepted that it is immoral
to permit someone, who has committed murder, robbery and
theft to live in the quiet enjoyment of his spoils.41
In due course, some early efforts at restitution were made,
primarily in the American Zone of Occupation. In November
1947, General Lucius D. Clay, the American Commander in Ger-
many, enacted legislation providing for the restitution of prop-
erty to Jewish survivors in the American Zone. General Clay later
wrote that "l[t] o ensure that the property of the Jewish people
who were killed in Germany and left no heirs would not benefit
German holders, a Jewish successor agency, formed by recog-
nized world Jewish organizations, was authorized to claim and
receive their property, including valuable cultural property. 42
Beginning in 1948, the Jewish Restitution Successor Organiza-
tion ("JRSO"), which was headquartered in Nuremberg,
presented tens of thousands of claims to private Jewish property
as well as claims for the restitution of communal property that
had been confiscated or seized from Jewish communities, orga-
nizations, and institutions. 4" The Jewish Trust Corporation, was
41. Norbert Woliheim, Belsen's Place in the Process of "Death-and-Rebirth" of the Jewish
People, in BELSEN, supra note 30, at 60.
42. Lucius D. CLAY, DECISION IN GERMANY 311 (1950).
43. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Restitution to Nazi Victims-A Milestone in International Mo-
rality, in Two GENERATIONS IN PERSPECTrVE 300, 301-03 (Harry Schneiderman, ed.,
1957); The Jewish Restitution Successor Organization ('RSO") was incorporated in
1946 in New York by The American Jewish Committee, The American Jewish Confer-
ence, the Joint Distribution Committee ('JDC"), the Board of Deputies of British Jews,
the Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, the Council for the Pro-
tection of the Rights and interests of Jews from Germany, the Jewish Agency, and the
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subsequently set up along the same lines to recover Jewish prop-
erty in the British Zone.4 4 According to Benjamin B. Ferencz,
the JRSO's Director General, in the American Zone alone,
property worth close to $250,000,000 was restored to former
owners, now living in sixty different countries throughout the
world. In addition, heirless assets worth over $25,000,000
were recovered. These proceeds were used to provide shelter
for refugees crowding tent camps in Israel, to aid needy Jews
still living in Germany, hard-core medical cases, the aged, the
blind and the destitute.45
Several of the German Ldnder in the American Zone also
promulgated indemnification laws providing for minimal com-
pensation to select categories of victims of Nazism from a fund
consisting in part of contributions by erstwhile Nazi officials,4 6
"but these decrees were too narrow in scope, too limited in ap-
plication and too arbitrary in their restrictions to be of help to
more than a very small percentage of the victims."4 7 Thus, for
example, only claimants who had been in Germany on or after
January 1, 1947 were covered under even the most liberal of
these laws, leaving Holocaust survivors who had left Germany be-
tween May 8, 1945 andJanuary 1, 1947 ineligible for compensa-
tion.4 8 Similar measures, albeit substantively less comprehensive,
were enacted in the British and French Zones of Occupation.4 9
The concept of limiting compensation to victims of Nazi perse-
cution who had remained in Germany past a fixed date was
sharply criticized in a comprehensive memorandum on Jewish
claims against Germany submitted on July 25, 1950 to Lord Hen-
derson, the British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, by A.L.
World Jewish Congress ("WJC"). These organizations were subsequently joined by
Agudas Israel World Organization, the Anglo-Jewish Association, the Central British
Fund, the Conseil Representatif des juifs de France, and the Arbeitsgemeinschafl Suiddeutscher
Landesverbdnde. Id. at 301. See also SAGi, supra note 3, at 41.
44. SAGi, supra note 3, at 41-42.
45. Ferencz, supra note 43, at 302.
46. DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 43.
47. Ferencz, supra note 43, at 304.
48. SAGI, supra note 3, at 88.
49. See generally, NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, RESTITUTION LEGISLATION IN GERMANY
(1949); Herbert Obenaus, Die widerwillige Wiedergutmachung: Das Land Niedersachsen und
diejiidischen Displaced Persons ["The Unwilling Reparations: The Land of Lower Saxony
and the Jewish Displaced Persons"], in IM SCHATrEN DES HOLOCAUST, supra note 32, at
83-118.
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Easterman, the Political Secretary of the WJC. 5° Easterman
pointed out that compensation was only payable under the dif-
ferent German compensation laws to individuals
who were resident in Germany on a particular date; in the
American Zone the date is 1st January, 1947, in the British
Zone, lstJanuary, 1948, while in Hamburg the date is even as
late as 1stJanuary, 1949. These dates are arbitrary and have
the effect of debarring from legitimate compensation many
thousands ofJewish and other victims of the Third Reich who
suffered injury and damage through imprisonment in con-
centration camps, and through the various other measures of
persecution inflicted upon them by the Nazi regime. To limit
and even to abrogate the just rights of these victims by fixing
a terminal date of residence in Germany is unreasonable and
unjust. No such limitation was fixed by the Nazi Government
in pursuing and executing the measures of persecution.
5 1
Among the specific criticisms of the legislation promulgated
in the British Zone was that in contrast with the indemnification
laws of the American Zone,
[e]xisting laws in the British Zone did not cover survivors liv-
ing outside Germany and did not provide for compensation
for economic losses. It was estimated that about 50,000 Ger-
man Jews who had migrated from the area.., in the British
Zone and Displaced Persons who had been in the concentra-
tion camps [there] were adversely affected by this law." 5
2
This inequity was specifically addressed by Hendrik Van Dam,
legal adviser to the Jewish Relief Unit in the British Zone and the
first Secretary General of the Central Council of Jews in Ger-
many, in an opinion that he submitted to the Israel Finance Min-
istry on July 1, 1950:
[L]egislation regarding damages, particularly damages for
imprisonment in the British Zone, are conditioned upon resi-
dence there on a fixed date. Pensions for persecutees are
paid only to residents of the state .... This covers the large
group of persons who passed through the Bergen-Belsen
camp. It may therefore be stated as a rule for practical pur-
poses that Jews resident abroad can scarcely collect damage
50. Letter, A.L. Easterman to The Rt. Hon. Lord Henderson (July 25, 1950) Ap-
pendix A, in BALAMRINS, supra note 2, at 273-82.
51. Id. at 278.
52. SAGi, supra note 3, at 88.
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claims.5
The restitution and indemnification legislation promul-
gated in the British Zone was substantially more restrictive than
in the American Zone in that it differentiated between German
citizens or residents on the one hand, and foreigners or stateless
persons-that is, virtually all the Jewish DPs-on the other.54
Not only was the threshold date for eligibility set one year later
than in the American Zone, but residents of DP camps such as
Bergen-Belsen were effectively excluded. Thus, the Lower Sax-
ony Haftentschddigungsgesetz (law for the indemnification for un-
lawful imprisonment) of July 31, 1949, limited indemnification
payments almost exclusively to victims of Nazism who had estab-
lished residence in Lower Saxony since at leastJanuary 1, 1948,"
thereby excludingJewish DPs living in DP camps "on the pretext
that a D.P. camp did not constitute a legal residence within the
[British] Zone, and that those contemplating emigration had
not in any case established permanent residence."56  The
amounts at issue were minimal. Eligible claimants received
monthly pensions of DM 150, or one-time payments of, in most
cases, DM 1000." 7 The Jewish DPs for the most part, however,
had no property or money, and desperately needed even such
meager compensation to emigrate from Germany and establish
themselves in Israel, the United States, or elsewhere. Represent-
atives of the Jewish DPs entered into lengthy, often acrimonious
negotiations with the Lower Saxony authorities to obtain what
they believed was owed to them. Confronted with the argument
that the terms of the statute were clear, one of the leaders of the
Jewish Committee in Hanover replied, "then you must change
the law, even if Mr. Rosensaft... would have to fly to London for
that purpose."58
In fact, Rosensaft and Wollheim at first attempted, with Eas-
terman's help, to get the British authorities to intercede, arguing
that the Lower Saxony legislation discriminated specifically
53. Hendrik van Dam, The Problems of Reparations and Restitution for Israel, in THE
GERMAN PATH To ISRAEL 21, 24 (Rolf Vogel ed., 1967).
54. Obenaus, supra note 49, at 90.
55. Id. at 91.
56. H. G. Van Dam, Legal Protection in Belsen, in BELSEN, supra note 30, at 148, 151.
See also Obenaus, supra note 49, at 91.
57. Obenaus, supra note 49, at 91.
58. Id. at 95 (author's trans.).
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against the Jewish DPs.59 When this argument proved unsuccess-
ful,6" they negotiated directly with the Lower Saxony officials,
enlisting the assistance of Jacob Altmeier, a Jewish member of
the FRG Parliament, Dr. Kurt Schumacher, chairman of the
West German Social Democratic Party, and Van Dam. 61 Such
direct negotiations were a departure by Rosensaft from his previ-
ously strict policy of not having any direct dealings whatsoever
with the German authorities.6 2 These efforts proved relatively
effective, ultimately resulting in a ruling from the Lower Saxony
Minister of Interior that enabled many of the Jewish DPs who
were still in Germany to receive compensation.6"
One major outstanding issue remained unresolved, how-
ever. When the Lower Saxony authorities refused to pay any
compensation retroactively to those Jewish DPs who had left Ger-
many after January 1, 1948, Rosensaft took on their cause. In
March 1950 he received a formal power of attorney from the
Israeli Consul in Munich with respect to claims by 18,000 such
Jewish DPs who had emigrated to Israel, and he pleaded their
case repeatedly, albeit unsuccessfully, before both the Lower
Saxony and the FRG authorities.6 4 According to historian Her-
bert Obenaus, "when the last Jewish DPs left for Israel" from
Upjever in August 1951, Rosensaft's power of attorney for the
18,000 DPs "lost any further relevance."65 As will be seen below,
this assessment is inaccurate.
III. THE ANTECEDENTS OF ADENAUER'S SEPTEMBER 27,
1951 DECLARATION
It is against the preceding historical background that the
relevant events leading up to the 1952 signing of the Luxem-
bourg Agreements must be viewed. The State of Israel was estab-
lished in 1948, and the FRG came into being the following year.
By then, the concept developed by Siegfried Moses and Nehe-
miah Robinson66 that Germany should pay some type of collec-
59. Id. at 101.
60. Id. at 102.
61. Id. at 103.
62. Josef Rosensaft, supra note 36, at 47-48; Obenaus, supra note 49, at 94, 103.
63. Obenaus, supra note 49, at 94-108.
64. Id. at 108-10.
65. Id. at 110.
66. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 22-28.
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tive reparations to the Jewish people as a whole, in addition to
paying compensation and making material restitution to individ-
uals, had ceased to be merely theoretical in nature. On a practi-
cal level, the JRSO had established a precedent by positioning
itself as the successor to heirless Jewish property, and using the
proceeds thereof to alleviate the hardship of Jewish Holocaust
survivors, in both Israel and Germany.6 7 On a political level, Dr.
Chaim Weizmann, the President of the Jewish Agency, had as-
serted a demand for collective restitution and reparations less
than four and a half months after the end of the Second World
War in a letter dated September 20, 1945, to the Governments of
the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and
France.6" Along the same lines as Robinson had argued the pre-
vious year,69 Weizmann wrote:
It should need no argument to prove that property by crime
rendered masterless should not be treated as bona vacantia,
and fall to the Governments which committed the crimes, or
to any other governments or to strangers having no title to it.
It is submitted that the provisions for heirless property falling
to the State were not designed to cover the case of mass-mur-
der of a people. Such properties belong to the victim, and
that victim is the Jewish people as a whole. The true heir,
therefore, is the Jewish people, and those properties should
be transferred to the representative of the Jewish people, to
be employed in the material, spiritual and cultural rehabilita-
tion of the Jews. 70
Weizmann further maintained that the Jewish people were also
entitled to "reparation to be obtained from Germany. "71 Ac-
cordingly, he contended (a) that title to heirless Jewish individ-
ual and communal property "should pass to the representatives
of the Jewish people, the realizable assets to be employed for the
rehabilitation of Jewish men, women and children;" (b) "[t] hat
67. Ferencz, supra note 43, at 302-03.
68. Letter, Chaim Weizmann on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to the
Governments of the United Kingdom, United States, U.S.S.R., and France concerning
restitution, indemnification and reparation (Sept. 20, 1945), in STATE OF ISRAEL, MINIS-
TRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GoV-
ERNMENT OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 9
[hereinafter DOCUMENTS].
69. ROBINSON, INDEMNIFICATION AND REPARATIONS, supra note 1, at 256-57. See
supra text accompanying note 28.
70. Letter (Sept. 20, 1945), supra note 68, at 11.
71. Id. at 12.
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in so far as such assets are to be employed in rehabilitating in
Palestine the Jewish victims of racial and religious persecution,
they should be entrusted to the Jewish Agency for this purpose;"
and (c) "[t]hat the Jewish people should be allotted a proper
percentage of reparations, to be entrusted to the Jewish Agency
for Palestine for the rehabilitation and resettlement in Palestine
of Jewish victims of racial and religious persecution. "72
At a December 1949 meeting in New York, the WJC issued a
declaration calling on the newly established Parliament of the
FRG, among other things, to accept moral and political responsi-
bility for the Nazi crimes against the Jewish people, and to pro-
vide material indemnification for these crimes.7" Implicit in this
declaration was the fact that the FRG could not be compelled to
pay such reparations; it would have to do so voluntarily. The
FRG, in short, had no legal obligation even to consider paying
collective reparations to the Jewish people. 4
Moreover, there did not exist at that time any one entity
that could authoritatively claim to represent even a majority of,
let alone the entire Jewish people. As Goldmann once wrote,
"there can be no legal spokesman [for the Jewish people], be-
cause the Jewish people are not a legal entity."75 An ideological
split existed between Zionists who believed in the concept of a
Jewish nation, and non-Zionists who saw themselves primarily as
Jewish citizens of their respective countries of residence. 76 Thus,
72. Id. Weizmann also proposed "[tihat the Jewish people's share of reparations
should include the assets of German Colonists in Palestine." Id. In fact, pursuant to yet
another protocol executed by Israel and the FRG on September 10, 1952 at Luxem-
bourg, Israel undertook to refund the value of the property of the German Templars in
Israel, which had been nationalized. BRECHER, supra note 20, at 96; SAGI, supra note 3,
at 148-49; see also Agreement between the Government of Israel and the Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany, concerning German property in Israel, Sept. 10,
1952, at Luxembourg, in DOCUMErs, supra note 68, at 167.
73. BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 86.
74. See Nahum Goldmann, A Noble Son of Jewry, in ESSAYS IN JEWISH SOCIOLOGY,
LABOUR AND CO-OPERATION: IN MEMORY OF DR. NOAH BAROU 1889-1995, at 11 (Henrik
F. Infield ed., 1962) [hereinafter IN MEMORY OF DR. NOAH BARou] (commenting with
respect to German-Jewish reparations that "[f]or the first time a people tried to make
some amends to another people who had not beaten them in war, whom they had no
legal obligation to pay").
75. GOLDMANN, THE JEWISH PARADOX, supra note 19, at 38.
76. See generally MENAHEM KAUFMAN, AN AMBIGUOUS PARTNERSHIP: NON ZIONISTS
AND ZIONISTS IN AMERICA, 1939-1948 (1991). In 1947,Judge Joseph M. Proskauer, Presi-
dent of the American Jewish Committee, stated that "against a negligible but vocal mi-
nority of nationalists we have stood steadfast for the principle that politically we are
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the Jewish Agency and, after May 15, 1948, the State of Israel,
could represent the interests ofJews, includingJewish Holocaust
survivors, living in Palestine/Israel, but had no authority, appar-
ent or otherwise, to speak on anyone else's behalf.77 Chaim
Weizmann implicitly acknowledged this fact in his letter of Sep-
tember 20, 1945, to the four Allied Governments when he called
for title of heirless Jewish property to be restored to "the repre-
sentatives of the Jewish people," but only asked that the Jewish
Agency be entrusted with such assets in so far as they would be
applied to the rehabilitation in Palestine of Jewish victims of ra-
cial and religious persecution."" The WJC, founded only in
1936, was international in scope, but did not represent many of
the Jewish communities and organizations. The Board of Depu-
ties of British Jews, for example, had declined to join the wJC,
necessitating the establishment of the WAJC's British Section.79
In the United States, meanwhile, there was no central body that
represented American Jewry, and the American Jewish Congress
was the only major American Jewish organization affiliated with
the wJC.8 ° Indeed, the Jewish victims of the Holocaust them-
selves were anything but monolithic. They had been citizens of
different countries before and during the war, and they had sub-
sequently either returned to their former homes or settled in
Palestine, the United States, Canada, South Africa, Latin
America, and elsewhere. Even the Jewish DPs had been unable
to form a single body to represent all the Jews living in Germany,
with the result that there were separate Central Committees of
Liberated Jews in the British and American Zones.8 '
In their seminal writings of the mid-1940s, both Moses and
Robinson recognized that a new entity would have to be created
to represent the Jewish people as a whole with respect to postwar
Americans, integrated wholly and completely with our fellow Americans into the life of
this country...." Id. at 237. See also GOLDMANN, THEJEWISH PARADOX, supra note 19, at
39 (noting that "the Zionist movement was unable to bring about unity").
77. See KAUFMAN, supra note 76, at 228-29, 249-50; HAMMER, supra note 16, at 49.
78. Letter (Sept. 20, 1945), supra note 68, at 12. See supra text accompanying note
72.
79. GOLDMANN, THE JEWISH PARADOX, supra note 19, at 41; RiEGNER, supra note 17,
at 627.
80. GOLDMANN, THEJEWISH PARADOX, supra note 19, at 41; RIEGNER, supra note 17,
at 628.
81. BRENNER, supra note 29, at 31-33, 97-98; KONIGSREDER & WETZEL, supra note 29,
at 79-87.
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German reparations. Moses wrote that the Jewish Agency, as
representative of the Jews of Palestine, should take the initiative
to unite the major organizations of world Jewry and the "emi-
grated Jews from Germany and other countries" into a "repre-
sentative body of the Jewish people that was capable of taking
action. "82 Robinson similarly advocated the creation of a new
'Jewish Agency for Reconstruction" on the practical ground that
[i]n order to avoid the loss of [property] toJewry a newJew-
ish title and title bearer must appear. The United Nations
and other states where Jewish property . . . is situated must
issue regulations transferring to an organization representing
the Jewish people all titles to such property and rights. It is
evident that only an organization representing large sections
of Jewry, internationally endowed with specific powers and
recognized status, would be entitled to claim these assets and
dispose of them in a manner ensuring their proper use.
83
The identity of the potential claimant with respect to collec-
tive reparations was discussed by both Hendrik Van Dam and
A.L. Easterman in their respective July 1950 analyses of the Ger-
man-Jewish reparations issue.84 Arguing that "[t]he only organ-
ized Jewish community within the meaning of international law
is the State of Israel,"85 Van Dam concluded that "[t]he Israel
government is not only the logical authority to present the repa-
ration claim as a claim of the community. It is also entitled and
obligated by the principles of diplomatic intervention to present
and prosecute the claims of its citizens. "86 Easterman, mean-
while, advocated (without referring to Israel) that German col-
lective indemnification to the Jewish people "should be made
available to and utilized by responsible Jewish organizations in
their efforts to rebuild the remnants of the destroyed Jewish
communities in the countries where the survivors of the Nazi
anti-Jewish persecution have found refuge in a new home-
land." 7
For the Government of Israel, the German-Jewish repara-
82. MOSES, supra note 1, at 46 (author's trans.).
83. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 257-58.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 51, and 53.
85. Van Dam, The Problems of Reparations and Restitution for Israel, supra note 53, at
23.
86. Id. at 24.
87. Letter (July 25, 1950), supra note 50, at 280.
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tions issue presented a particularly sensitive problem. In 1950,
when Van Dam submitted his opinion to Israel's Finance Minis-
try, Israel had no formal relations or official dealings with the
FRG. Israelis as well as most Jews throughout the world consid-
ered Germany to be a pariah nation.88 An Israeli Consul was in
Munich primarily to facilitate the processing of immigrants to
Israel. However, he was initially accredited to the American mili-
tary government, and remained in place after 1949 without ever
being accredited to the FRG.89 On January 16, 1951, in a clear
attempt to avoid having to address the FRG directly, the Israel
Government sent a note to the United States, the United King-
dom, and France,9" in which it criticized as inadequate the ex-
isting German indemnification legislation, and called for,
among other things, "the adoption of a General Claims Law for
the whole of the Federal Republic of Germany."91 In another
Note, dated March 12, 1951, this time addressed to the four Oc-
cupying Powers,92 the Israel Government described in detail the
atrocities committed by Germany against the Jewish people be-
tween 1933 and 1945;9 3 and demanded reparations in the
amount of U.S.$1.5 billion, based "only on the expenditures in-
curred and anticipated in connection with the resettlement of
the Jewish immigrants from the countries formerly under Nazi
control," whose number the Note estimated "at about
500,000."" 4  Moreover, the Israel Government added, this
U.S.$1.5 billion figure
88. See DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 24-25 (regarding Israeli attitudes toward
Germany prior to 1952, "[n]ext to grief, a wave of hatred mounted in Israel against
those who had committed such crimes and against those who had permitted them to
happen"); SACHAR, supra note 2, at 33 ("[t]he very name 'Germany' was a stench and
abomination for the Israeli people"). See generally BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 93, 119;
S-AFR, supra note 2, 105-21; THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 53, at 19.
89. DoMINIQUE TRIMBUR, DE LA SHOAH A LA RECONCILIATION ["From the Holo-
caust to Reconciliation"] 23-28 (2000); BRECHER, supra note 22, at 75 n.3.
90. Israel Note of January 16, 1951, to the United States, United Kingdom, and
France concerning restitution and indemnification, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at
13.
91. Id. at 15-16. The Note also called attention to the fact that by absorbing the
majority of the Jewish DPs from Germany, Israel had "shouldered a financial burden
which would otherwise have fallen on the Occupation Authorities." Id. at 15.
92. Israel Note of March 12, 1951, to the four Occupying Powers concerning repa-
rations, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 20. The Note to France was submitted on
March 11, 1951. Id.
93. Id. at 20-22.
94. Id. at 24.
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corresponds approximately to the value of exports from West-
ern Germany alone in 1950, which, in view of Germany's eco-
nomic recovery, is likely to increase considerably during 1951.
If spread over a period of years and transferred partly in the
form of goods, a reparation payment of this total would not
be beyond the capacity of the German people. No settlement
of German reparations can be regarded as equitable on
moral or legal grounds which would not meet this minimum
claim on behalf of the major sufferers of the Nazi regime.
Nor can there be any approach to the rehabilitation of Ger-
many among the community of nations until this basic mea-
sure of reparation has been affected.9 5
The three Western Allies, while expressing sympathy, declined to
take any action in support of Israel's claim.9 6 In their respective
replies to Israel's note of March 12, 1951, the United States and
the United Kingdom both noted that they would not "impose"
upon the FRG the obligation to pay reparations to Israel.9 7 The
implication was clear. If Israel wanted reparations from Ger-
many, it would have to deal directly with the FRG.
In addition to the moral issues involved, there were overrid-
ing pragmatic considerations. The impetus for Israel's 1951 ini-
tiative to obtain reparations from Germany was Israel's dire eco-
nomic condition which
was harsh in the last months of 1950; graver, perhaps, than at
any other period in the state's independent existence. All the
indicators were negative as a result of the mass immigration
that predominantly characterized that austerity period: from
May 1948 to the end of 1951 Israel's Jewish population more
than doubled, from 650,000 to 1,324,000. The major tasks
were to provide food, clothing and shelter to the impover-
ished survivors of the Displaced Persons camps in Europe and
Cyprus, and to the underprivileged immigrants from Iraq and
Yemen, as well as employment for immigrants and demobil-
ized soldiers.9"
95. Id.
96. See Notes of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, in Docu-
MENTS, supra note 67, at 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 39.
97. United States Note of July 5, 1951, in reply to Israel Note of March 12, 1951,
concerning reparations, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 34, 35; United Kingdom Note
of July 5, 1951, in reply to Israel Note of March 12, 1951, concerning reparations, in
DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 36, 37.
98. BRECHER, supra note 20, at 59-60.
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Israel simply did not have the resources to finance the absorp-
tion of close to 500,000 Jewish victims of Nazi persecution99 on
its own. The assistance provided by emergency loans from the
United States and several Western European countries was only
temporary in nature.1 0 Thus, a major financial infusion of any
kind, whether from Germany or elsewhere, was highly desirable.
By 1951 Israel's imports were exceeding its exports by five
times, and the lack of raw materials and electric power cre-
ated prolonged factory work stoppages. With the Israeli
pound collapsing, even veteran citizens had become depen-
dent on food parcels sent by relatives overseas. This was the
crisis that impelled the Israeli government to look to Ger-
many for help.' 1
In late 1950, David Horowitz, director general of Israel's Fi-
nance Ministry, persuaded Moshe Sharett and David Ben Gu-
rion, respectively Israel's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister,
of both the necessity and feasibility of asserting a U.S. $1.5 bil-
lion claim against Germany. Following limited discussion, the
Israel Cabinet decided on January 3, 1951 to seek and accept
reparations for Jewish property plundered by Nazi Germany.1 0 2
When the indirect approach via the four powers proved unsuc-
cessful, Horowitz, accompanied by Maurice Fischer, the Israel
Minister to France, met secretly with FRG Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer in Paris in 1951. At this meeting, Horowitz made
Israel's case for reparations and, at Sharett's instructions, set
forth two prerequisites to any German-Israeli interaction: the
FRG had to (a) issue a formal acknowledgment of Germany's
crimes against the Jewish people, and (b) agree that any repara-
tions would be in line with Israel's claim. Adenauer reacted posi-
tively, but made no commitments.1 0 3
Meanwhile, Barou was independently searching for a way to
persuade the German authorities to voluntarily assume the obli-
gation to provide monetary restitution to the Jewish people. Be-
99. The number given in Israel's Note of March 12, 1951, see supra text accompany-
ing note 94.
100. SACHAR, supra note 2, at 33.
101. Id. Regarding the general state of Israel's economy between 1948 and 1952,
see BALABK1NS, supra note 2, at 96-118.
102. BRECHER, supra note 20, at 75-76.
103. Id. at 78; DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 34. CHARLES WILLIAMS, ADENAUER:
THE FATHER OF THE NEW GERMANY 372 (2000).
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ginning in 1950, the London WJC leader held private discus-
sions on this subject in London as well as in Germany with nu-
merous German political figures, bankers, and industrialists.10 4
Among them was Herbert Blankenhorn, one of the Chancellor's
closest aides and advisers. 105 Blankenhorn accepted the WJC's
1949 declaration on Germany as a basis for further discussions,
but Barou, like Horowitz, insisted that no formal German-Jewish
or German-Israeli dialogue could take place without an official
statement by Adenauer before the German Parliament contain-
ing two essential elements: an acknowledgment of Germany's
responsibility for the Nazi crimes against the Jewish people; and
an undertaking, in the name of his government, to make mate-
rial amends to Israel and the Jewish people for the losses suf-
fered by European Jewry.'0 6 Discussions between Barou and
Blankenhorn, who was also present at Adenauer's meeting with
Horowitz,10 7 went on for some time.
In July 1951, Barou brought Rosensaft into the picture.0 A
German-Jewish businessman named Gerhard Lewy, a former
schoolmate of Blankenhorn, had approached Barou and offered
to intercede with Blankenhorn.' °9 On July 14, 1951, Barou
104. BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 86-87; RIEGNER, supra note 17, at 565-67.
105. DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 30-31; BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 87, 89-90;
RIEGNER, supra note 17, at 566; GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHER JUDE, supra
note 19, at 378-79. Blankenhorn's role in bringing about the Luxembourg Agreements
cannot be underestimated. See BRECHER, supra note 20, at 73-74. In early 1951, when
Adenauer became the FRG's Foreign Minister in addition to being Chancellor, Blank-
enhom became Political Director of the FRG Foreign Office. Together with Staats-
sekretdr Walter Hallstein, the FRG's de facto Foreign Minister between 1951 and 1958,
Blankenhorn was a consistent supporter of and advocate for meaningful German repa-
rations to the Jewish people. See WILLIAMS, supra note 103, at 336, 364, 371-75; GOLD-
MANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHER JUDE, at 411; 100th Birthday of Walter Hallstein:
First President of the European Commission, News Release No. 86/01 of the European
Union, Nov. 17, 2001.
106. DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 30-31; BALABKTNS, supra note 2, at 90.
107. BRECHER, supra note 20, at 78.
108. Beginning in 1945, Rosensaft and Barou had developed a close political and
personal relationship. After Barou's death in 1955, Rosensaft wrote that Barou "was
among the very first and very few who came to us soon after liberation and fought with
us for our freedom and our dignity." Rosensaft, supra note 36, at 32. Rosensaft subse-
quently wrote: "There hardly was taken any action [at Belsen] without the participation
of Dr. Barou. Whether the problem was of a political nature, or concerned the attain-
ing of emigration certificates, or how to obtain more food and freedom, Barou was
there." Josef Rosensaft, Barou in Belsen, in IN MEMORY OF NOAH BARou, supra note 74, at
23.
109. HADAssAH ROSENSA-r, YESTERDAY- My STORY 130 (1997) (unpublished manu-
script). See also DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 30 ("According to German government
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wrote to Rosensaft in Upjever, asking him to get in touch with
Lewy and arrange for Rosensaft to meet Blankenhorn."1 1 It was
shortly after that meeting that Barou and Rosensaft met with
Goldmann in Zurich to suggest that Goldmann formally negoti-
ate a reparations agreement with Adenauer.11 At the Zurich
meeting, Goldmann was informed not only that Blankenhorn
had at last agreed to persuade Adenauer to issue a formal decla-
ration along the lines that both Horowitz and Barou had set
forth, but also that Blankenhorn, with Barou's participation, had
actually prepared a draft of such a statement. 1 2 The proposed
text neither mentioned the State of Israel, which was, after all,
intended to be the principal beneficiary of the reparations, nor
contained an unambiguous acknowledgment of the German
State's responsibility for Germany's crimes against the Jews."1 3
Goldmann proceeded to edit the draft, and several days later,
Barou gave the revised version to Blankenhorn.1 4 Adenauer
then decided to rewrite the declaration himself, making it dryer
in tone but keeping the essential elements. 15
IV. ADENA UER'S DECLARATION OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1951,
CREATION OF THE CLAIMS CONFERENCE, AND
GOLDMANN'S MEETING WITH ADENA UER
ON DECEMBER 6, 1951
On September 27, 1951, Adenauer read his declaration in
sources, a German-Jewish businessman is said to have made the first direct approach to
Dr. Herbert Blankenhorn").
110. Letter, Barou to Rosensaft (July 14, 1951). Rosensaft Archive; see text follow-
ing note 20.
111. HADAssAH ROSENSArT, supra note 109, at 130; RiEGNER, supra note 19, at 566-
67. Following this meeting Goldmann and Barou asked Rosensaft to continue his in-
volvement in the reparations negotiations, frequently traveling to Germany to meet
with Blankenhor as well as Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, Secretary of State Wal-
ter Hallstein of the FRG Foreign Ministry, and other FRG officials. Id. at 130. Hadassah
Rosensaft later recalled that "[w]ith Blankenhorn's help, Yossel arranged numerous
secret meetings between Barou, Goldmann, and members of the German cabinet who
were involved in the negotiations." Id. at 130-31. Rosensaft, Goldmann, and Barou also
created a code to be used in letters and telegrams, referring to Adenauer as "Zaken"
(Hebrew for "Old One"), Blankenhorn as "Bruno," Hallstein as "Harry," Erhard as
"Leo," and FRG Finance Minister Fritz Schaffer as "Kalkala" (Hebrew for "Finance").
Id. at 131.
112. RIEGNER, supra note 17, at 566-67.
113. Id. at 567.
114. Id. at 567-68.
115. Id. at 568.
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the Bundestag, the lower house of the FRG Parliament. He ac-
knowledged the "immeasurable suffering that was brought to
bear upon the Jews in Germany and in the occupied territories
during the time of National Socialism." ''"6 While maintaining
that "[tihe great majority of the German people abhorred the
crimes committed against the Jews, and had no part in them," he
proclaimed that
unspeakable crimes were perpetrated in the name of the Ger-
man people, which impose upon them the obligation to
make moral and material amends, both as regards the indi-
vidual damage that Jews have suffered and as regards Jewish
property for which there are no longer individual claim-
ants.... The Federal Government will see to it that the resti-
tution legislation is rapidly completed and that it is justly im-
plemented.117
Adenauer then made a historically unprecedented offer in the
name of his government, announcing that "[t]he Federal Gov-
ernment is prepared, jointly with representatives of Jewry and
the State of Israel, which has admitted so many homeless Jewish
refugees, to bring about a solution of the material reparation
problem in order to facilitate the way to a spiritual purging of
unheard-of suffering."" It was not just that the West German
Chancellor voluntarily declared that the FRG was willing to ne-
gotiate what he called the "material reparation problem" with
Israel, another sovereign State, albeit one with which the FRG
had no formal relations. In his declaration, Adenauer acknowl-
edged the legitimacy of Israel's claim to be indemnified for the
cost of absorbing the survivors of the Holocaust, and he recog-
nizing the Jewish people as a separate negotiation partner-not
any one specific entity such as the WJC or the Jewish Agency,
but, far more broadly, the "representatives of Jewry."
On October 26, 1951, at the suggestion of Israeli Foreign
Minister Moshe Sharett, 119 Goldmann who was then co-chairman
of the Jewish Agency as well as President of the WJC, invited the
representatives of twenty-three American and international Jew-
116. Adenauer Statement on Restitution, in GROSSMANN supra note 5, at 59, 60.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHERJUDE, supra note 19, at 377 (author's
trans.); SAGI, supra note 3, at 74; RONALD W. ZWEIG, GERMAN REPARATIONS AND THE
JEWISH WORLD: A HISTORY OF THE CLAIMS CONFERENCE 15 (1987).
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ish organizations120 to a meeting in New York under the auspices
of the World Zionist Organization "for the purpose of giving
public support to Israel's claim against Germany ... and to dis-
cuss ways and means how best to organize such support in the
future." 12 ' Goldmann's goal was to obtain the organizations' ac-
ceptance in principle of direct negotiations with the FRG, and
for them to authorize a small leadership group to take part in
such negotiations on behalf of the Jewish people outside of
Israel. 22 The outcome of this meeting was the creation of the
Claims Conference, with Goldmann as President and Saul Ka-
gan, the JRSO's Executive Secretary who had been that agency's
Director of Plans and Operations from 1948 until 1951, as Exec-
utive Secretary.1 23 In the resolutions adopted at the end of the
meeting, the Conference expressed "wholehearted support" for
Israel's claim against Germany, demanded "satisfaction of all
other Jewish claims against Germany," and called for immediate
steps to improve existing restitution and indemnification legisla-
tion, "to enact such legislation where it does not exist and to
speed up the settlement of Jewish claims .... 24
It is noteworthy that the different priorities with respect to
German reparations were very much in evidence at the founding
meeting of the Claims Conference. Abba Eban, Israel's Ambas-
sador to the United Nations, reiterated Israel's claim for
U.S.$1.5 billion, and Goldmann proclaimed that "the highest
moral validity lies in our doing everything possible to satisfy the
claims of Israel and of the Jewish people, enabling hundreds of
120. Agudas Israel World Organization, Alliance Israelite Universelle, American
Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, JDC, American Zionist Council, Anglo-
Jewish Association, B'nai B'rith, Board of Deputies of BritishJews, the British Section of
the WJC, Canadian Jewish Congress, Central British Fund, Conseil Representatif des
Juifs en France, Council for the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Jews from
Germany, Delegacion de Associaciones Israelitas Argentinas (D.A.I.A.), Executive
Council of Australian Jewry, Jewish Agency, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish War Veter-
ans of the U.S.A., South African Jewish Board of Deputies, Synagogue Council of
America, WJC, Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland. CLIMS CONFERENCE CHRONOL-
OGY, supra note 10, at 8.
121. ZwEIG, supra note 119, at 15.
122. Id. at 16-17.
123. Id. at 18-19. Kagan had previously been Chief of the Financial Intelligence
Department for the U.S. Military Government in Germany. Id. at 19.
124. Resolutions of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany,
on the subject of material claims from Germany, New York, October 26, 1951, in Docu-
MENTS, supra note 68, at 46.
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thousands of new immigrants to enter Israel."' 25 In contrast, Ja-
cob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee,
called for an early settlement of "all claims," emphasizing that
"[t] he claims of the State of Israel are not the only claims. We
must press equally for the claims of all Jewry."
- 1 26
With the Claims Conference established, Ben Gurion au-
thorized Goldmann to try to obtain Adenauer's acceptance of
the figure of U.S.$1 billion as the starting point for negotia-
tions. 2 7 On December 6, 1952, Goldmann and Adenauer met
for the first time in secret at Claridge's Hotel in London.
121
Later that day, in a two-paragraph letter to Goldmann, Adenauer
wrote:
In connection with the statement made by the Federal Gov-
ernment in the Bundestag on September 27, 1951, in which it
declared its readiness to start negotiations with representa-
tives of the Jewish people and Israel with regard to Repara-
tion for damage done under the Nazi regime, I want to in-
form you that the Federal Government considers that the
time has come when such negotiations should begin. I ask
you, in your capacity as Chairman of the Conference on Jew-
ish Claims against Germany to make this known both to the
Conference and the Government of Israel.
I want to state that the Federal Government sees in the prob-
lem of reparation above all also a moral duty and regards it as
an obligation of honor for the German people to do every-
thing possible to repair the injustice done to the Jewish peo-
ple. The Federal Government will welcome in this connec-
tion the possibility of contributing to the upbuilding of the
State of Israel through the delivery of goods. The Federal
Government is ready to accept the claims which the Govern-
ment of the State of Israel has formulated in its note of March
12, 1951 as the basis for these negotiations."'
Goldmann had accomplished his mission. By referring to
Israel's Note of March 12, 1951,13 in which Israel had de-
manded U.S.$1.5 billion in reparations from Germany,
Adenauer had implicitly agreed that a U.S.$1 billion demand
125. German Payment Studied by Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1951, at 11.
126. Id.
127. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALS DEUTSCHER JUDE, supra note 19, at 382.
128. Id. at 384-87.
129. Adenauer Letter to Dr. Goldmann, in GROSSMANN, supra note 5, at 61.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
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would not be unrealistic. Moreover, Adenauer was now offering
Israel tangible "delivery of goods," as opposed to his prior refer-
ence to an abstract "solution of the material reparation prob-
lem" in his Bundestag declaration of September 27th.13 ' Finally,
by asking Goldmann to inform the Claims Conference of the
FRG's willingness to negotiate, Adenauer had conferred upon
the Claims Conference the requisite "recognized status" contem-
plated by Robinson, 3 2 and effectively acknowledged its standing
to assert a collective claim for reparations on behalf of the Jewish
people.
V. REACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL
Adenauer's offer to negotiate was met with a decidedly
mixed reaction in both Israel and the American Jewish commu-
nity. Most of the American Jewish organizational leadership
viewed positively the FRG's professed willingness to make tangi-
ble amends for the Third Reich's crimes against the Jews.' 33
Others were less receptive. Advocating the continuation of a
policy of absolute non-fraternization, one right-wing Zionist ar-
gued that Germany was morally "untouchable" and not a fit part-
ner to any international deliberations.13 4 The Yiddish poet Ja-
cob Glatstein called Adenauer's declaration "a lying docu-
ment."'35 Samuel Gringauz, a former leader of the Jewish DPs in
the American Zone, wrote that "[w] e may have to become recon-
ciled to the thought that at least a generation might pass before
relations between Germans and Jews enter upon a 'new and
healthy basis. ' " 3 6 Supporters of German-Jewish negotiations
were more pragmatic, arguing that the issue on the table was not
reconciliation with the enemy but merely a settling of accounts.
Goldmann explained that "[w] e are not dealing here with a quid
pro quo. Nobody is saying to the Germans: You pay us; we for-
give you. We are promising nothing; we are offering nothing.
We are simply claiming what is ours, morally and legally." 3 '
The debate in Israel was far less restrained. There were
131. GROSSMANN, supra note 5, at 60.
132. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 257-58.
133. SHAFIR, supra note 2, at 170.
134. BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 93.
135. SHAFIR, supra note 2, at 170.
136. Id.
137. BALABIUNS, supra note 2, at 94.
S-292001]
S-30 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:S-1
heated arguments within the Israel Cabinet on whether or not to
accept Adenauer's offer of negotiations. 38 In early January,
1952, when the Government formally asked the Knesset, the
Israel Parliament, for formal authorization to enter into direct
talks with the FRG, Menachem Begin, the leader of the national-
ist Herut Party, called for and organized demonstrations in the
streets.13 9 The ensuing parliamentary debate was the stormiest
and most violent in Israel's history, with both socialist and right-
wing deputies mercilessly attacking the centrist Government. 4 '
Ya'akov Hazan of the Marxist Mapam Party, charged that
"[n]egotiations mean recognition of a neo-Nazi Government,
managed mostly by ex-Nazis . . . -" ' Thousands of demonstra-
tors protested outside the Knesset and hurled stones through its
windows. When the police used tear gas to control the crowd, a
Herut Member of Knesset exclaimed, "gas against the Jews; with
that you will win!"1 4 2 Begin accused Ben Gurion of being a
"murderer," '143 and was suspended from the Knesset for three
months for his unruly behavior.14 4 In the end, the Government
obtained Knesset endorsement of direct Israeli-German negotia-
tions by a vote of sixty to fifty-one, with five abstentions and four
members absent. 45
VI. THE WASSENAAR NEGOTIATIONS AND THE
LUXEMBOURG AGREEMENTS
On March 21, 1952, the delegations from the Israel Govern-
ment, the Claims Conference, and the FRG met for the first time
at Wassenaar outside The Hague in the Netherlands. The Israel
delegation was headed by two former German Jews who emi-
grated to Palestine after Hitler's advent to power, Giora
Josephthal, the Treasurer of the Jewish Agency and head of its
Absorption Department, and Felix Shinnar, the head of a special
department set up at the Israel Foreign Ministry to deal with Jew-
ish claims against Germany and former Economic Counselor to
138. BREC1ER, supra note 20, at 82-84.
139. Id. at 85; BALARKINS, supra note 2, at 121.
140. BRECHER, supra note 20, at 85.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 86.
144. DAVID BEN GURION, ISRAEL: A PERSONAL HISTORY 400 (1972).
145. BRECHER, supra note 20, at 88.
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the Israel Legation in London.'4 6 The Claims Conference dele-
gation was headed by Moses A. Leavitt, Executive Vice Chairman
of the JDC. A.L. Easterman was one of its members, and Nehe-
miah Robinson, Hendrik Van Dam, and Benjamin Ferencz were
among its legal experts.147 The German delegation was headed
by Professor Franz B6hm, Dean of the Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe University in Frankfurt, who had publicly acknowledged
German culpability for the Nazi crimes against the Jews. B6hm's
deputy was Dr. Otto Kfister of Stuttgart, a prominent Stuttgart
attorney and expert on restitution issues who had been dis-
missed as a judge in 1933 for refusing to cooperate with the Nazi
authorities. 148 It was decided at the outset that the FRG delega-
tion would hold separate daily meetings Monday through Friday,
with the Israel delegation in the morning, and with the Claims
Conference delegation in the afternoon.1 49 It was also decided
that discussions would be held in English, but since most of the
members of the Israel delegations were originally from Ger-
many, most of the German-Israeli negotiations ended up being
conducted in German. 150
In its opening statement, the Israel delegation asserted a
claim against the FRG in the amount of U.S.$1 billion, based on
a U.S.$1.5 billion claim "against Germany as a whole."'51  This
claim was "calculated on the basis of the expenditure incurred in
Israel in the resettlement of the Jewish victims of Nazi persecu-
tion .... "152 In this first official encounter between representa-
tives of Israel and the FRG, the Israel delegation emphasized
that
[i]t must furthermore be clearly understood that the satisfac-
tion of Israel's claim cannot be regarded as constituting in
any way an expiation of the fearful holocaust of 6 million Jews
murdered in Europe, and of the destruction of ancientJewish
Communities and their precious spiritual possessions. These
146. GROSSMANN supra note 5, at 19-20; BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 89.
147. GROSSMANN, supra note 5, at 20, 36.
148. DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 54.
149. SAGi, supra note 3, at 105-06.
150. Id. at 105.
151. Israel Delegation's statement of March 21, 1952, at the opening of the negoti-
ations on reparations, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 69, 74. The balance of U.S.$500
million of Israel's claim was apportioned in absentia, as it were, to the Communist Ger-
man Democratic Republic. DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 56.
152. Israel Delegation's statement of March 21, 1952, supra note 151, at 74.
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losses cannot be made good by any material recompense.
The claim advanced by the State of Israel is thus both mini-
mal in its size and symbolic in its character. For settling the
historic account, the hour has not yet come. 153
In its opening statement, the Claims Conference reaffirmed
its wholehearted support of Israel's claim "in respect of the reha-
bilitation in Israel of victims of Nazi persecution"154 and outlined
the nature of its claims with respect to both compensation legis-
lation and heirless Jewish property. 115 The Conference's princi-
pal concern regarding individual compensation was that
[t]he most striking deficiency in this field is that only frag-
mentary legislation has yet been enacted by the German
Linder in the British Zone to deal with indemnification
claims. The Conference proposes that the Federal Govern-
ment should assume responsibility for securing the enact-
ment of adequate indemnification legislation for the whole of
the Federal Republic. Adequate legislation should secure
compensation for groups of persecutes now excluded, or in-
sufficiently provided for. Satisfactory and speedy implemen-
tation is of the essence.1 56
The Conference referred only generally to the principle that
"[h] eirless and unclaimed Jewish property should accrue to Jew-
ish organizations caring for the surviving victims of Nazism," not-
ing that there were "important areas of damage to which this
principle must be extended in order to narrow the gulf between
the amounts illegally received and the value returned."157
Three days later, the Conference quantified its global claim
in the amount of U.S.$500 million with respect to heirless and
unclaimed Jewish assets, to be paid over a five-year period.15' At
this time, the Conference also proposed numerous specific legis-
153. Id. To the best of the authors' knowledge, this was the first time that the term
"holocaust" was publicly used to describe the Nazi persecution and genocide of Euro-
pean Jewry.
154. Statement of the Delegation of the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
against Germany of March 21, 1952, at the opening of the negotiations on reparations,
in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 75.
155. Id. at 78.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Outline of Proposals and Claims Presented by the Delegation of the Confer-
ence [on] Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, Mar. 24, 1952, at 2. Rosensaft
Archive.
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lative measures with respect to individual restitution and indem-
nification. These proposals included the demand that the FRG
"should extend to the whole area of its territories satisfactory
General Claims legislation," modeled upon the laws in effect in
the American Zone, that "should be implemented within a pe-
riod of three years, on the basis of full equality between residents
of Western Germany and claimants residing abroad."1 59 Such
General Claims legislation was to:
(a) provide fullest compensation for various categories of ec-
onomic losses;
(b) grant compensation for deprivation of liberty to Dis-
placed Persons who left Germany prior to January 1,
1947; Jews formerly resident in Germany who emigrated
from Nazi Germany; and Jews who were compelled to live
underground within Germany;
(c) clearly assume responsibility of pensions to officials of
former Jewish communities and institutions;
(d) simplify the requirements of proof in recognition of the
unavailability of documentary evidence required to sub-
stantiate claims;
(e) provide that the claims under the indemnification legisla-
tion be made inheritable, in all cases, to near relatives.
1 60
The Conference's legislative proposals thus addressed many of
the objections to German restitution laws and policies that had
previously been raised in Easterman's and Van Dam's respective
July 1950 discussions of German-Jewish reparations, 16 1 and that
had been the subject of Rosensaft's negotiations with the Lower
Saxony authorities.162
The German delegation's opening statement, while it re-
ferred to Adenauer's Bundestag declaration of September 27,
1951, and acknowledged Germany's "obligation to make repara-
tions" ("Wiedergutmachungspflicht"), emphasized that the FRG's
ability to meet the asserted claims was restricted by Allied regula-
tions and the FRG's obligations to Germany's pre-war credi-
tors.'6 3 In addition, the Israeli and Jewish claims would have to
159. Id. at 1.
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51, 53.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 55-65.
163. German Delegation's statement of March 21, 1952, at the opening of the ne-
gotiations on reparations, in DOCUMENTS, supra note 68, at 79, 80-81.
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be considered in the light of the FRG's other "reparations obli-
gations. 1' 6
4
The course of these negotiations was rocky, with the amount
of the reparations for Israel the principal source of contention.
There was early agreement with respect to most of the Claims
Conference's legislative proposals, 165 but the Conference's
global claim was deferred, and remained unsettled, until the last
phase of the negotiations.166 Both the FRG Finance Minister,
Fritz Schdiffer and Hermann J. Abs, Chairman of the Board of
Deutsche Bank and the FRG's chief foreign debt negotiator,
wanted the Israeli and Jewish reparations claims to be resolved
within the broader context of a settlement of the FRG's external
debts. The Israeli and Claims Conference delegations at Was-
senaar, on the other hand, insisted that the Jewish claims for
compensation had to be settled independently and exclusively
on their own merit.'6 7 The two heads of the FRG delegation
agreed with the Israeli and Jewish position, with B6hm threaten-
ing to resign, and Kaister actually resigning, in protest against
the FRG Government's equivocation. 168  Barou subsequently
wrote that there was
a clear division... between the position taken by the German
industrial and working-class organizations on the one hand,
and by financial and banking circles on the other. The first
group supported a settlement in the spirit of Dr. Adenauer's
Declaration; the other group made every effort to extend the
period of payments to anywhere up to thirty years and to re-
duce yearly payments to 100 million Marks."
169
Beginning in April 1952, Adenauer and Goldmann ex-
changed letters and held a series of personal discussions that
164. Id. at 81.
165. ZWEIG, supra note 119, at 22. See generally SAGI, supra note 3, at 114-28.
166. ZWEIG, supra note 119, at 22; GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHERJUDE,
supra note 19, at 390; SAGI, supra note 3, at 128.
167. For details about the negotiations, see generally SAGi, supra note 3;
BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 119-36; DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 49-71; BRECHER, supra
note 20, at 90-102.
168. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHER JUDE, supra note 19, at 395; SAG!,
supra note 3, at 136.
169. N. Barou, Origin of the German Agreement, in CONGRESS WEEKLY, OCt. 13, 1952,
at 6, 7.
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kept the talks from collapsing altogether. 7 ° Ultimately, it was
Goldmann who negotiated many of the general terms of the
Luxembourg Agreements, first with B6hm in Paris on May 23,
1952,171 and then with senior FRG officials, including Hallstein,
B6hm, and Abs, in Bonn on June 10, 1952.772 Israel was to re-
ceive DM 3 billion in commodities and services over a twelve-year
period, amounting to around seventy percent of its original
claim. Goldmann compromised much more with regard to the
Claims Conference's global claim. He agreed to accept DM 500
million, one quarter of the demanded U.S.$500 million, which
would also be payable in commodities to Israel, with the Israel
Government in turn undertaking to make payment to the Con-
ference.1 3 However, the Conference had decided early on that
Israel's claim would have priority,'7 4 and that satisfaction of the
legislative demands would take precedence over the Confer-
ence's global claim. 175 Adenauer personally took part in the
Bonn negotiations, and on June 17, 1952, he presented the
terms of the agreed-upon reparations to his Cabinet.1 76
Subsequently, in Wassenaar, the FRG negotiators continued
to question the magnitude of Jewish heirless property, and they
demanded an accounting of the various Jewish organizations'
past expenditures on behalf of the victims of Nazism. In re-
170. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHERJUDE, supra note 19, at 392404; DEU-
TSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 60-68.
171. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHERJUDE, supra note 19, at 396-97; SAGI,
supra note 3, at 139-42. Barou as well asJosephthal, Shinnar, and Gershon Avner of the
Israel Delegation at Wassenaar also participated in these negotiations. GOLDMANN,
MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHERJUDE, supra note 19, at 397; SAGI, supra note 3, at 139.
172. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN Ass DEUTSCHERJUDE, supra note 19, at 398403; SAG!,
supra note 3, at 143-45. Barou and Shinnar also participated in these negotiations.
GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALS DEUTSCHERJUDE, supra note 19, at 398; SAGI, supra note 3,
at 143.
173. Letter, Goldmann to Adenauer (July 11, 1952). Rosensaft Archive; see also
DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 67; SAG1, supra note 3, at 140; ZwEIG, supra note 119, at
23.
174. ZWEic, supra note 119, at 23.
175. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHER JUDE, supra note 19, at 388; SAGI,
supra note 3, at 111; ZWEIG, supra note 119, at 23 (quoting Claims Conference Executive
Committee's directive of March 13, 1952, to the Negotiating Team that "[a]s a general
rule the satisfaction of individual claims should have priority over the aggregate claim.
In other words, if the satisfaction of the most pressing individual claims will appear
impossible at the same time as the assignment of an aggregate amount, concessions
should be made on the latter").
176. DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4, at 66-68; GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALs DEUTSCHER
JUDE, supra note 19, at 403.
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sponse, the Claims Conference provided two detailed memo-
randa. The first established that the value of Jewish heirless as-
sets far exceeded the combined Israeli and Jewish claims. The
second showed that the Jewish organizations had already spent
in excess of U.S.$1.1 billion on the relief, rehabilitation, and re-
settlement of victims of Nazi persecution, and expected to have
to pay substantial amounts for this purpose in the future.177 The
issue was ultimately resolved, again with Goldmann's involve-
ment, by having the DM 500 million payment characterized as a
"hardship fund" for the benefit of "needy refugees dispersed in
all the countries of the world."178 This DM 500 million figure
was subsequently further reduced to DM 450 million, with the
FRG undertaking to allocate DM 50 million for reparations to
Christian converts ofJewish origins who had been victims of Nazi
persecution.179
There does not appear to have been much discussion or
controversy concerning the principal elements of the individual
compensation claim, although according to two accounts, Gold-
mann agreed to reduce the settlement of the Claims Confer-
ence's global claim from DM 500 million to DM 450 million in
exchange for a promise that the FRG would enact the agreed-
upon legislation in the immediate future.18 The FRG negotia-
tors also maintained that a sovereign government could not
enter into a bilateral agreement requiring parliamentary ratifica-
tion with a private party such as the Claims Conference. 8 Gold-
mann proposed to Blankenhorn that the FRG issue a declaration
that it would incorporate the agreed-upon legislative principles
into the appropriate legislation, and that an agreement between
the two delegations would be acceptable with respect to the DM
450 million payment.1 2 Leavitt, the head of the Claims Confer-
ence delegation, insisted that a governmental agreement with a
private entity was possible, citing prior agreements between the
JRSO and the Ldnder as precedent. Ultimately, it was decided
177. SAci, supra note 3, at 149-50; ZWEIG, supra note 119, at 23-24.
178. Letter, Goldmann to Adenauer (July 11, 1952), at 1, supra note 173 (author's
trans.). See also ZWEIG, supra note 119, at 24.
179. GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN ALS DEUTSCHER JUDE, supra note 19, at 404; SAGI,
supra note 3, at 151; ZWEIG, supra note 119, at 24.
180. BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 135; SAGi, supra note 3, at 151.
181. SAGI, supra note 3, at 163.
182. Letter, Goldmann to Blankenhorn (July 28, 1952). Rosensaft Archive.
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that the FRG and the Conference would execute protocols,
which, unlike bilateral agreements, did not require parliamen-
tary ratification."8 3 It turned out to be a distinction that made
little practical or substantive difference. Since the DM 450 mil-
lion global payment to the Claims Conference was to be made
via Israel, it, too, was part of the Treaty between Israel and the
FRG, and therefore subject to ratification.18 1 Similarly, Protocol
No. 1 sets forth a "legislative programme" for the improvement
of existing legislation in the FRG "for the redress of Nationalist
wrongs" that could only be implemented by the FRG Parliament.
Accordingly, regardless of the FRG negotiators' formalistic pos-
turing at Wassenaar, all three parts of the Luxembourg Agree-
ments required the approval of the FRG Parliament to become
effective. With all the substantive issues resolved, the three sepa-
rate accords were put in final form at Wassenaar, and the negoti-
ations were concluded on August 27, 1952.85 On September 10,
183. SAGI, supra note 3, at 163. Both Protocols No. 1 and No. 2 "are appended" to
the Treaty "for reference purposes only." Agreement Between the Federal Republic of
Germany and the State of Israel, art. 16(b), GROSSMANN, supra note 5, at 48.
184. Article I(b) of the Treaty provides that:
the Federal Republic of Germany shall, in compliance with the obligation un-
dertaken in Article 1 of Protocol No. 2 this day drawn up and signed between
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Conference on
Jewish Material Claims against Germany, pay to Israel for the benefit of the
said Conference the sum of 450 million Deutsche Mark; the said sum of 450
million Deutsche Mark shall be used for the purposes set out in Article 2 of
the said Protocol.
GROSSMANN, supra note 5, at 37. Article 2 of Protocol No. 2 provides in relevant part
that this sum of DM 450 million
will be used for the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of Jewish victims of
National Socialist persecution, according to the urgency of their needs as de-
termined by the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany.
Such amounts will, in principle, be used for the benefit of victims who at the
time of the conclusion of the present Agreement were living outside of Israel.
Id. at 56.
185. BALABKINS, supra note 2, at 135-36. On August 1, 1952, Barou wrote to Gold-
mann informing him of the most recent developments regarding the finalization of the
reparations agreements, noting that:
Rosensaft has probably already seen you to-day [sic] and informed you of our
conversations in Germany. I had a firm promise from Bruno that he or Harry
would watch over the proceedings there very carefully and help us to bring
them to a conclusion within the next ten days. Bruno is going away for a
week's holiday on Sunday but Harry will be there to see that nothing happens.
Letter, Barou to Goldmann (August 1, 1952). Rosensaft Archive. The references to
"Bruno" and "Harry" were code references to Blankenhorn and FRG Foreign Ministry
Secretary of State Walter Hallstein, respectively. See supra note 111 and accompanying
text. As late as August 24, 1952, Adenauer asked Blankenhorn if the term "Verbrechen"
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1952, the FRG, Israel, and the Claims Conference formally en-
tered into the Luxembourg Agreements, and despite opposition
from prominent members of Adenauer's own Christian Demo-
cratic Union party and a boycott threat against the FRG from
Arab countries, the Treaty between Israel and the FRG was rati-
fied by the Bundestag on March 18, 1953 by a vote of 239 in favor
and 35 against with 86 abstentions. Two days later, the Treaty
was approved by the Bundesrat, the upper house of the FRG Par-
liament.1 8 6
While most of the attention, and most of the controversy,
centered on the amount of reparations Israel was to receive from
the FRG, the provisions embodied in Protocol No. I are evi-
dence of the Claims Conference negotiators' commitment to the
principle that individual survivors were no less entitled to repara-
tions than the collective represented by the State of Israel. As
Noah Barou wrote shortly after the Luxembourg Agreements
had been executed, "the program of legislation upon which the
Claims Conference and the German Government agreed, can
benefit hundreds of thousands of Jews all over the world."187
The pivotal roles of Goldmann and Barou in bringing about
these precedent-setting reparations accords has deservedly been
acknowledged.' However, in their private writings, Goldmann
and Barou themselves recognized Rosensaft's unpublicized in-
volvement as essential to the process. On October 12, 1952,
Goldmann wrote to Rosensaft to express his "profound apprecia-
tion" for the latter's role during the "difficult months" leading
up to the signing of the reparations agreements with Ger-
many."8 "What you did and accomplished," Goldmann wrote,
"was of the greatest significance for the successful conclusion of
the negotiations. You had to carry out many delicate tasks, and
(crimes) in the preamble to the Agreement with Israel could be changed to "Unrecht"
(injustice). Letter, Adenauer to Blankenhorn (Aug. 24, 1952). Rosensaft Archive. (au-
thor's trans.). The term used in the final version was "criminal acts." Preamble to
Agreement Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel, GROSS-
MANN, supra note 5, at 37. Other minor wording changes requested by Adenauer in the
same letter were made.
186. See GOLDMANN, MEIN LEBEN A-s DEUTSCHER JUDE, supra note 19, at 405-07;
BAI AIKINS, supra note 2, at 137-50; BRECHER, supra note 20, at 96-97.
187. N. Barou, Origin of the German Agreement, supra note 169, at 8.
188. See, e.g., BALASKINS, supra note 2, at 90, 92; GOLDSMITH, supra note 14, at 28-
29; Avi Beker, Introduction: Unmasking National Myths-Europeans Challenge their History,
in THE PLUNDER OF JEWISH PROPERTY DURING THE HOLOCAUST, supra note 11, at 3.
189. Letter, Goldmann to Rosensaft (Oct. 12, 1952). Rosensaft Archive.
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did so with great tact and understanding.... The fact that your
work took place behind the scenes increases its value." 90 On
October 17, 1952, Barou wrote to Rabbi Israel Goldstein in New
York that Rosensaft
has given us very valuable assistance in the Israel-German ne-
gotiations .... Mr. Rosensaft is one of the initiators of the
idea, that our national organizations should undertake a very
important task in helping the thousands of DP[ ]s, scattered
all over the world, in getting their compensation from Ger-
many under the legislation agreed upon in Wassenaar. 91
VII. ROSENSAFT'S PARALLEL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE
INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS OF JEWISH DPS FROM
BERGEN-BELSEN WHO HAD EMIGRATED
TO ISRAEL
During the latter part of 1951 and throughout 1952, while
the above-discussed events leading up to the Luxembourg Agree-
ments were occurring, Rosensaft remained preoccupied with the
specific unresolved problem that affected 18,000Jewish DPs who
had emigrated from Belsen to Israel beforeJanuary 1, 1948, and
who hence were ineligible for compensation under the restric-
tive Lower Saxony Haftentschddigungsgesetz.92 According to doc-
uments in the Rosensaft Archive, he did not give up in attempt-
ing to arrive at a solution that would enable them to receive rep-
arations outside the statutory framework.
On September 28, 1951, the day after Adenauer's declara-
tion in the Bundestag, Salomon Adler Rudel, a senior official of
the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, wrote to Rosensaft in Switzer-
land advising him that he had sent a letter to Goldmann, pre-
sumably discussing the issue of reparations, and asking Rosensaft
to see that conflict and misunderstanding with the Agency's
office in Germany is avoided. I do not think that you will
have any difficulty but it is necessary that they are informed
about all important matters so that your activities should not
interfere or damage other negotiations which are going on at
190. Id. (author's trans.).
191. Letter, Barou to 1. Goldstein (Oct. 17, 1952). Rosensaft Archive.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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the same time. 19
3
Adler Rudel went on to refer to a proposal by Goldmann that
Rosensaft "come to Israel as soon as possible for further consul-
tation," and noted that "I have already mentioned in my letter to
Dr. Goldmann that the statement of the Bonn Government
might have some bearing on the indemnification problem.
Please consider this also very carefully and do not rush into any
hasty action." t" 4 On October 11, 1951, Goldmann wrote to Ad-
ler Rudel that "I don't think whatever we will get from Lower
Saxony will conflict with the global agreement with Adenauer
and you may be sure that I will see to it that there should not be
any conflicts." 9 ' The "activities" to which Adler Rudel was refer-
ring in this correspondence were most likely Rosensaft's ongo-
ing efforts on behalf of the above-mentioned 18,000 Jewish DPs
for whom he held a power of attorney. Adler Rudel may well
have been concerned that Rosensaft's "activities" in this respect
could have an adverse impact on Adenauer's offer to negotiate
collective "material reparation" with Israel and representatives of
the Jewish people.' 96
On October 18, 1951, Blankenhorn invited Rosensaft to
Bonn to discuss "questions of mutual interest."'9 7 On October
30, 1951, Barou wrote to Rosensaft and Riegner from New York
that he had discussed with Goldmann
in detail the question of whether we should proceed without
delay with the problem of Lower Saxony. The opinion of the
two of us is that the matter must be dealt with with great ur-
gency because when the conversations will start, it may have
less chance.
I would not, therefore, wait for my coming to Germany and if
Yosel can make progress with the people in Hanover, he
should see Bruno by himself, or if you think it is necessary,
you could fly over for this special meeting in Lower Sax-
193. Letter, S. Adler Rudel to Rosensaft (Sept. 28, 1951). Rosensaft Archive. The
letter to Goldmann referred to in Adler Rudel's letter is not in the Rosensaft Archive.
194. Id.
195. Letter, Goldmann to Adler Rudel (Oct. 11, 1951). Rosensaft Archive.
196. Adenauer Declaration on Restitution, in GROSSMANN, supra note 5, at 60. See
supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
197. Letter, Blankenhorn to Rosensaft (Oct. 18, 1951) (author's trans.) Rosensaft
Archive.
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ony. 198
On December 27, 1951, Blankenhorn wrote to Rosensaft with
respect to the matter of the Hafientschddigung (indemnification
for false imprisonment) "of the Jews who had emigrated from
Belsen to Israel."19 9 Blankenhorn took "particular note" that the
demands put forward by Rosensaft "stand outside the demands
asserted by the State of Israel," and wrote:
I believe that your demands could be settled by means of the
delivery of goods, as this is contemplated in the settlement of
Jewish claims for reparations that was proclaimed in the dec-
laration of the Federal Government of 27 September 1951.
I want to assure you that the Federal Government is inter-
ested to bring about rapidly at least a partial resolution of this
matter. I would be indebted to you if you could shortly pro-
vide me with concrete, documented proposals on this subject,
[including] what goods come into consideration for such a
settlement.
20 0
On January 4, 1952, Goldmann both wrote and cabled to
Riegner that Rosensaft should fly to Israel "without delay" for
discussions with senior officials of the government and the Jew-
ish Agency with regard to technical aspects of the reparations
issue. 20 ' The precise nature of the ensuing discussions are not
known, but they were apparently constructive. An undated draft
of a telegram addressed to Riegner on an Israeli form printed in
1947, and most likely in Barou's handwriting, states that 'josel's
proposition received favourable my conversations started satis-
factorily regards best wishes Noah Josel."
20 2
The agreed-upon means of resolving the compensation
claims of the 18,000 emigrated Jewish DPs appears to have been
198. Letter from Barou, addressed to Riegner but with the salutation, "My dear
Riegner and Yosel" (Oct. 30, 1951). Rosensaft Archive.
199. Letter, Blankenhorn to Rosensaft (Dec. 27, 1951) (author's trans.) Rosensaft
Archive. The letter is addressed to Rosensaft as "Bevollmiichtigter der ausgeandertenjfidis-
chen DP's aus Belsen in Israel," the "authorized agent of the Jewish DPs who have emi-
grated from Belsen to Israel."
200. Id. (author's trans.) In his letter, Blankenhorn refers to a memorandum he
had received from Rosensaft regarding the reparations claims of the emigrated DPs,
and containing proposed solutions to the problem. No copy of such a memorandum
has been located in the Rosensaft Archive.
201. Letter, Goldmann to Riegner (Jan. 4, 1952); Telegram, Riegner to Rosensaft
(Jan. 7, 1952). Rosensaft Archive.
202. Undated draft of telegram addressed to Riegner. Rosensaft Archive.
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a special shipment of around DM 20 million worth of pharma-
ceutical products from the FRG to Israel. 2°3 Goldmann dis-
cussed this issue with Adenauer on several occasions during the
course of their various meetings in the spring and summer of
1952.204 On June 12, 1952, three months before the Luxem-
bourg Agreements were executed, Goldmann wrote to Rosen-
saft, enclosing a letter of the same date to Adenauer.2 °5 In his
letter to Rosensaft, Goldmann asked Rosensaft to give the
Adenauer letter to "Bruno" (meaning Blankenhorn 20 6 ), leaving
it to Blankenhorn "to decide if and when to submit it to the
Chancellor."20 7 In his June 12, 1952 letter to Adenauer, Gold-
mann asked the FRG Chancellor to expedite the prompt deliv-
ery to Israel of pharmaceutical products valued up to DM 20 mil-
lion. "I do not have to tell you," Goldmann wrote, "what this
means, since, every time we have discussed these questions, you
have shown great understanding for precisely this kind of assis-
tance. 2 °8 On August 1, 1952, Barou wrote to Goldmann that
'Jossel [sic] has suggested that as you will be in Zurich I should
come over and meet you, him and Riegner and discuss the prob-
lem of individual claims (Israeli citizens) .... "209 On September
18, 1952, Goldmann brought the subject up again in a letter to
Hallstein, Staatssekretdr (Secretary of State) in the FRG Foreign
Office. 21  Goldmann reminded Hallstein that Adenauer had
"many months ago" shown a personal interest in the proposal
that in discharge the payment of individual claims in Lower
Saxony, which the Saxon [sic] government is unable to satisfy
because of a lack of money, the Federal Republic would ad-
203. Letter, Goldmann to Adenauer (June 12, 1952); Letter, Goldmann to FRG
Secretary of State Walter Hallstein (Sept. 18, 1952). Rosensaft Archive. In his letter of
January 4, 1952 to Riegner, Goldmann wrote, without further explanation, that "[a]s
soon as the Germans place the 22 million to disposal, a committee of three must, in my
opinion, be created that will make decisions on all transactions and that will also be
responsible for the account." Letter (Jan. 4, 1952), supra note 201 (author's trans.).
204. See supra note 200; Letter, Goldmann to Adenauer (June 12, 1952); Letter,
Goldmann to Hallstein (Sept. 18, 1952). Rosensaft Archive.
205. Letter, Goldmann to Rosensaft (June 12, 1952). Rosensaft Archive.
206. See supra note 111.
207. Letter, Goldmann to Rosensaft (June 12, 1952), supra note 205 (author's
trans.).
208. Letter, Goldmann to Adenauer (June 12, 1952), supra note 204 (author's
trans.).
209. Letter, Barou to Goldmann (Aug. 1, 1952), supra note 185.
210. Letter, Goldmann to Hallstein (Sept. 18, 1952), supra note 203.
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vance the amount of twenty or twenty-five million Mark for
medicine and hospital equipment, that would be purchased
for Israel and sent to Israel.' l"
There are no further documents on this subject in the
Rosensaft Archive, nor have we been able to determine whether
or not the plan to purchase and send pharmaceutical and medi-
cal equipment to Israel was ever implemented. According to
Van Dam, the "injustice" represented by Lower Saxony's refusal
to pay compensation to these DPs was removed within the con-
text of the Luxembourg Agreements and the FRG's subse-
quently promulgated reparations legislation.21 2 It was clear even
after the terms of Protocol No. 1 had been agreed upon that it
would take a long time for any new legislation to go into effect.
New reparations statutes first had to be drafted and enacted.
Thereafter, claimants would have to filJ out and file applications,
which would then have to be reviewed by FRG officials. Thus,
there were no realistic expectations in 1952 that Holocaust survi-
vors would receive German reparations any time soon. While
the 18,000 Jewish DPs in question, and others similarly situated,
would have been covered under the terms of Protocol No. 1 of
the Luxembourg Agreements, and would eventually have been
eligible for reparations from the FRG, it appears from the availa-
ble documentation that Rosensaft tried to obtain compensation
for them on an accelerated basis. We do not know if he was
successful. There can be no question, however, that he made
every effort on their behalf.
CONCLUSION
The Luxembourg Agreements have had a profound impact
on post-Holocaust German-Jewish and German-Israeli relations.
They constituted the immediate catalyst for a process of reconcil-
iation that enabled Israel to establish full diplomatic relations
with the FRG in 1965,213 a prospect that had been virtually un-
211. Id. (author's trans.). Goldmann added that Adenauer had agreed that im-
mediately after the completion of the reparations negotiations, Gerhard Riegner of the
WJC in Geneva would go to Germany to arrange for this transaction, and hoped that
Riegner would receive the necessary credentials and documentation for his "unofficial
mission." Id.
212. See Van Dam, Legal Protection in Belsen, supra note 56, at 151.
213. See generally DEUTSCHKRON, supra note 4; BALABKINS, supra note 2; BRECHER,
supra note 20, at 65-110; THE GERMAN PATH TO ISRAEL, supra note 53.
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thinkable in 1951. They also provided the framework for a mas-
sive infusion of capital into Israel's economy, and a reparations
infrastructure that has provided more than 585,000 Jewish Holo-
caust survivors with aggregate reparations of more than DM 102
billion.2 1 4 While two of the three principal historical studies of
the reparations process focused primarily on the German-Israeli
relationship,215 these individual reparations, mostly in the form
of monthly pensions, have made an ongoing difference in the
lives of the survivors, and have been no less significant. It is espe-
cially noteworthy from a contemporary perspective that these
reparations were obtained through voluntary negotiations, and
as the direct result of efforts by dedicated Israeli public officials
and Jewish communal leaders, rather than as the result of litiga-
tion of any kind.
In this context, Rosensaft's attempts to achieve a positive
resolution of the grievances of the Jewish DPs who had been de-
nied compensation by Lower Saxony is significant. But for his
persistence, it is unlikely that anyone would have paid attention
to the relatively insubstantial individual claims of these 18,000
Holocaust survivors who were trying to start new lives in Israel in
the early 1950s. The fact that he was able to enlist the sympathy
and support of Goldmann and Barou in this pursuit serves as yet
another example of their commitment to the principle that Ger-
many had an obligation to compensate the Jewish survivors for
the egregious suffering and material losses they had endured.
The fact that Blankenhorn and Adenauer reacted sympatheti-
cally to a request, made outside the framework of the formal ne-
gotiations, on behalf of a group of Jewish Holocaust survivors
who had been denied even minimal reparations underscores the
morality of Rosensaft's position. Adenauer and Blankenhorn
214. See CLAIMs CONFERENCE CHRONOLOGY, supra note 10, at 17. Under legislation
enacted by the FRG pursuant to Protocol No. 1, 277,804 Jewish Holocaust survivors
have received reparations payments aggregating DM 100 billion as of December 31,
2000. Id. at 13-15, 17. In addition, also as of December 31, 2000, 307,564 otherJewish
survivors who were ineligible for reparations under the aforementioned legislation have
received individual payments aggregating DM 2.7 billion from special funds established
by the FRG (and, since 1990, the Government of the reunited Germany) pursuant to
negotiations with the Claims Conference. Id. at 16-17, 22-25.
215. Both Balabkins, supra note 2, and Deutschkron, supra note 4, concentrate for
the most part on the German-Israeli negotiations. The exception is Sagi, supra note 3,
who chronicles the Wassenaar negotiations in their entirety.
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would not have been likely to waste their time on trying to find
solutions for problems that they did not deem to be meritorious.
Moreover, Rosensaft may also have had an impact on other
aspects of the process leading up to the Luxembourg Agree-
ments. It is noteworthy that the legislative scheme for FRG repa-
rations legislation proposed at Wassenaar consistently included
the extension to the British Zone of the provisions of the more
liberal indemnifications laws that were in force in the American
Zone. Rosensaft had unsuccessfully tried to persuade the au-
thorities in Lower Saxony to do precisely that. While there does
not exist extrinsic evidence in this regard, it is possible to infer
that at the very least, Rosensaft made sure that the grievances of
the Jewish DPs from the British Zone would not be overlooked
during the Wassenaar negotiations. We in no way mean to over-
state Rosensaft's role in what has been called the "Twisted Road"
toward German-Jewish reparations.216 However, it is likely that,
within the context of the monumental collective claims that were
being asserted in the name of Israel and the Jewish people, his
insistence on maintaining a focus on the rights and needs of in-
dividual survivors provided a powerful impetus for the formal
demands by the Claims Conference that the FRG promulgate
and implement the comprehensive German reparations legisla-
tive scheme that was ultimately embodied in Protocol No. 1.
216. SH AIR, supra note 2, at 7, 159.
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